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THE IMPACT OF ALDINGER v. HOWARD ON
PENDENT PARTY JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has recently reexamined pendent party
jurisdiction in Aldinger v. Howard.' Monica Aldinger, a clerical
worker, was fired by Merton Howard, county treasurer of
Spokane County, Washington. She was told that the firing was
due to her living with her boyfriend. Her pursuit of legal redress
for the dismissal resulted in a decision casting some doubt on the
power of federal courts to hear "pendent party" claims in gen-
eral and rejecting altogether such jurisdiction in suits brought
under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.2
Plaintiff alleged that defendants Howard, the county, and
the County Commissioners violated her substantive3 and pro-
cedural4 federal constitutional rights. Suing under section 1983,
she sought both damages for her lost salary and an injunction
ordering her reinstatement. The county was alleged to be vicari-
ously liable 5 for the acts of treasurer Howard and was joined as a
defendant under section 1983 and as a "pendent party." Plaintiff
asserted that pendent jurisdiction, which allows a federal court
to join a claim lacking independent subject matter jurisdiction to
a claim conferring federal jurisdiction,6 could be extended to
reach parties who were not defendants to the federal claims. The
district court's dismissal of the county as defendant 7 was af-
'96 S. Ct. 2413 (1976).
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, cus-
tom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
3 The Second Amended Complaint sought relief under the first, ninth, and four-
teenth amendments. Appendix at 15-16, Aldinger v. Howard, 96 S. Ct. 2413 (1976).
The merit of Aldinger's claim was not before the Court nor is it the subject of this
Comment.
I A hearing was requested by Aldinger, but allegedly none was held either before
or after her dismissal. 96 S. Ct. at 2415.
-See WASH. REV. CODE § 4.08.120 (1974) (authorizing actions in tort or contract
against county); id. § 4.96.010 (holding political subdivisions liable for torts of em-
ployees).
6 See text accompanying note 21 infra. -
7 Appendix, supra note 3, at 20-2 1.
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firmed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.8 The
court followed the established rule that local government
entities9 were not liable under section 19831" and also dismissed
plaintiff's state law claim premised on respondeat superior for
want of subject matter jurisdiction. Although "not unaware of
the widespread rejection"'1 of its approach by the other circuits,
the court reaffirmed its view that jurisdiction does not exist over
a "pendent party" not subject to a federal jurisdiction-conferring
claim. 12
The Supreme Court, limiting certiorari to the question of
pendent jurisdiction over the county, affirmed. It believed that
jurisdiction over a pendent party should be determined by look-
ing to the "scope" of the cause of action enabling entry into
federal court.13 Because the Court had previously held that
Congress did not intend that municipalities incur liability under
section 1983, it concluded that allowing a federal court to hear
pendent state law claims of vicarious liability against the county
would "circumvent" the municipality exclusion carved out by
Congress.
14
This Comment explores the reasoning and reach of Aldin-
ger. Basing its holding on an approach to pendent party jurisdic-
tion neither argued in the briefs nor raised in the literature on
the subject,15 the Court's interpretation overlooks a number of
' Aldinger v. Howard, 513 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 2413 (1976).
9 The terms city, county, municipality, and local government are used interchange-
ably in this Comment.
"o 513 F.2d at 1259. This issue was settled by Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961)
(city not liable for damages under § 1983) and City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507
(1973) (local government entities not liable in equity under § 1983). In Moor v. County
of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), the Court held municipalities not liable under § 1983
even if the state had waived municipal immunity from tort liability, and upheld dis-
cretionary dismissal of the pendent party claim against the county. See note 81 infra.
1 513 F.2d at 1261. See note 23 infra.
12 See Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969).
13 Aldinger v. Howard, 96 S. Ct. 2413, 2421 (1976). The narrow issue in
Aldinger-the power to join nonfederal parties to § 1983 suits-had received a mixed
reaction in the circuit and district courts. Compare Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972); Redding v. Medica, 402 F. Supp. 1260
(W.D. Pa. 1975) (pendent defendant allowed); Stamm v. Trigg, 368 F. Supp. 83 (N.D.
Ohio 1973) (pendent defendant allowed); Eidshun v. Pierce, 335 F. Supp. 603 (S.D.
Iowa 1971) (allowing pendent action) with, e.g., Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir.
1969); Greenway v. Thompson, 368 F. Supp. 387 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (dismissing pendent
municipality on ground that it enjoys municipal tort immunity); Anthony v. Cleveland,
355 F. Supp. 789 (D. Hawaii 1973) (disallowing pendent party defendant under Ninth
Circuit rule); Fire v. City of Winner, 352 F. Supp. 925 (D.S.D. 1972) (discretionary dis-
missal of tort claim pendent to § 1983 claim).
14 96 S. Ct. at 2421.
15 E.g., Fortune, Pendent Jurisdiction--the Problem of "Pendenting Parties", 34 U. Pr=r.
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historical and logical problems that indicate difficulties with the
approach itself. Although Aldinger now governs pendent party
jurisdiction in section 1983 cases, it should be limited to that
context.
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,'16 the seminal pendent party
jurisdiction case from which Aldinger departs, should be used in
other contexts to determine the appropriateness of asserting
federal jurisdiction over nonfederal claims and parties.
I. THE CASE FOR PENDENT PARTY JURISDICTION
Aldinger relied principally on two prudential arguments,
based on the law of res judicata1 7 and of ancillary jurisdiction,'
8
favoring pendent party jurisdiction. These considerations, as
well as those recognized in Gibbs,' 9 favor the "pendenting" of the
municipal defendant despite the lack of independent federal
subject matter jurisdiction.
A. The Influence of Gibbs
That state law claims against a party may be heard in federal
court as pendent to a federal claim against the same defendant
has long been settled. Joining a claim against one defendant that
is beyond the reach of federal subject matter jurisdiction to a
factually-related federal suit against another defendant did not
seem feasible, however, until Gibbs propounded the modern rule
of pendent jurisdiction:
Pendent jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial power, exists
whenever there is a claim "arising under [the] Constitu-
tion, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under their Authority . . ."
L. REV. 1 (1972); Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L.
REv. 262 (1968); Comment, Federal Pendent Subject Matter Jurisdiction--the Doctrine of
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs Extended to Persons Not Party to the Jurisdiction-Conferring
Claims, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 153 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Columbia Note]; Note,
UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARV. L. REv. 657 (1968); Comment, Pendent
and Ancillayy Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of Two Doctrines, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1263
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Synthesis]; Note, Federal Pendent Party Jurisdiction and United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs-Federal Question and Diversity Cases, 62 VA. L. REv. 194 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Virginia Note]; 4 U. TOL. L. REV. 201 (1973).
16 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
1'7 See generally Fortune, supra note 15, at 8-9; McCormack, Federalism and Section
1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections (Parts I & II), 60 VA.
L. REV. 1, 250 (1974); Columbia Comment, supra note 15, at 166; Virginia Note, supra
note 15, at 209-14.
See generally Synthesis, supra note 15.
19 See text accompanying notes 26-28 infra.
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U.S. Const., Art. III, § 2, and the relationship between
that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion
that the entire action before the court comprises but
one constitutional "case." The federal claim must have
substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction
on the court. . . .The state and federal claims must
derive from a common nucleus of operative fact. But if,
considered without regard to their federal or state
character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial
proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal
issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole.
That power need not be exercised in every case
in which it is found to exist. It has consistently been
recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of dis-
cretion, not of plaintiff's right. Its justification lies in
considerations of judicial economy, convenience and
fairness to litigants; if these are not present a federal
court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state
claims, even though bound to apply state law to them.
20
Gibbs thus created a two-part test for the "pendenting" of claims
not otherwise within federal jurisdiction: power exists when the
state and federal claims arise from the same "operative facts,"
and discretion is appropriate when prompted by considerations
of economy, convenience, and fairness.
Gibbs, however, involved a pendent claim rather than a pen-
dent party. 21 The lower courts have been left to apply the ra-
tionale of Gibbs to the "pendenting" of parties. Six circuits have
relied on Gibbs to find federal court jurisdiction over pendent
parties, 22 while only the Ninth and the Seventh Circuits have
20 383 U.S. at 725-26 (footnotes omitted).
21 There is dictum in Gibbs to augment the case for pendent parties. In arguing for
a more generous application of pendent jurisdiction in general, the Court took note
that under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "joinder of... parties .. .is strongly
encouraged." Id. at 724. The reference is presumably to rules 14 and 20, FED. R. Civ.
P. 14 & 20, and to the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, see text accompanying notes
49-58 infra. Of course the rules themselves cannot overstep the constitutional limitations
of federal jurisdiction.
22 Second Circuit: Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 944 (1972) (class action failing to meet amount in controversy pendent to
§ 1983 suit); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971) (state
tort claim pendent to federal suit in admiralty); Astor-Honor Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap,
Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971) (state unfair competition claim pendent to federal
copyright claim).
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adhered to their pre-Gibbs positions23 that pendent jurisdiction
would not reach parties not defendant to the jurisdiction-
conferring claim.
2 4
Those courts and commentators who favor pendent party
jurisdiction look to the same principles of economy, convenience,
and fairness animating Gibbs.25 In allowing the "pendenting" of
a state claim, Gibbs acknowledged such considerations as the fear
of inconsistent adjudication or prejudicial application of res
judicata if claims are raised separately, 26 the need to adjudicate
federal questions and state law issues implicating federal policy
in federal court,27 the liberal joinder philosophy of the federal
Third Circuit: Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
995 (1974) (state tort claim pendent to federal civil rights claim); Jacobson v. Atlantic
City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968) (pendent party defendant in diversity suit
when amount in controversy not sufficient as to that pary); Wilson v. American Chain
& Cable Co., 364 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1966) (pendent party plaintiff, parent suing for
consequential damages in child's federal tort suit).
Fourth Circuit: Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968) (pendent party defen-
dant in diversity suit).
Fifth Circuit: Florida E.C.R.R. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1975) (state
tort claim pendent to Federal Tort Claims Act claim); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v.
Craton, 405 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1968) (pendent party defendant in federal labor relations
suit).
Sixth Circuit: Beautytuft, Inc. v. Factory Ins. Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1970)
(pendent party defendant in diversity suit); F.C. Stiles Contracting Co. v. Home Ins.
Co., 431 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1970) (same). See Patrum v. City of Greensburg, 419 F.2d
1300 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990 (1970) (affirming discretionary refusal to
join municipality as pendent defendant in § 1983 suit against police).
Eighth Circuit: Schulman v. Huck Finn, Inc., 472 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1973)
(copyright and pendent unfair competition claims); Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969) (wife's claim for loss of consortium pendent to husband's
diversity suit).
The First and Tenth Circuits have not had the opportunity to consider pendent
party jurisdiction.
22 See Wojtas v. Village of Niles, 334 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1964); Kataoka v. May
Dep't Stores Co., 115 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1940).
24 Seventh Circuit: Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 917 (1974) (diversity suit). Ninth Circuit: Aldinger v. Howard, 513 F.2d
1257 (9th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 2413 (1976); Moor v. Madigan, 458 F.2d 1217 (9th
Cir. 1972) (no cognizable federal claim under Civil Rights Act, therefore pendent state
claim should be dismissed), aff'd in part sub nom. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S.
693 (1973); Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969) (wife's claim for loss of con-
sortium not pendent to husband's diversity suit). Because these cases rely on pre-Gibbs
holdings, supra note 24, they are "suspect as authority." 3A MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
18.07[l.-4], at 1953 (2d ed. 1948).
25 E.g., Curtis v. Everette, 489 F.2d 516, 520 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
995 (1974); Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 811 (2d Cir. 1971).
26 E.g., Fortune, supra note 15, at 7-9. See text accompanying notes 34-48 infra.
27 E.g., Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1085 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 944 (1972).
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rules of civil procedure,28 the principle of avoidance of constitu-
tional questions,2 9 and the similarity of pendent party to ancil-
lary jurisdiction. " These considerations can be applied to de-
termining the propriety of pendenting a party as well as a claim.
Indeed, nothing in Gibbs indicates that, as long as the pendent
party claim arises from the same "operative facts" as the
jurisdiction-conferring claim, the joinder of the pendent party
would violate the constitutional requirements for the assertion of
federal jurisdiction. A district court may in its discretion join
pendent parties without transgressing the jurisdictional limits of
the "case or controversy" requirement of article III; the flexi-
bility of article III in not requiring that there never be a non-
federal litigant is evidenced by the allowance of ancillary juris-
diction. 31
The pendent party question arises under varied configura-
tions of litigants, including proposed additional plaintiffs as well
as defendants, who may or may not already be ancillary parties.
Pendent party jurisdiction may be asserted in both diversity and
federal question suits, and, in the latter case, under a multitude
of federal statutes. 32 The Gibbs two-part test provides standards
for ascertaining when courts should use discretion to consider
claims involving such various configurations. Aldinger did not
recognize this discretion, though. The Court imposed a flat ban
on pendent party jurisdiction in section 1983 cases without con-
sidering the resultant logical inconsistency and impracticality. Al-
dinger leaves a section 1983 plaintiff with three unsatisfactory
alternatives: to bring the federal claim only and forego monetary
recovery against the municipality; to bring both the federal and
state claims in state court and frustrate the policy of federal
court adjudication of federal rights; or to bring separate federal
and state actions and risk the res judicata effect if the first suit
reaching a decision is lost.
28 See Synthesis, supra note 15, at 1273.
29 In Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944
(1972), joinder of the pendent party claim enabled the court to dispose of the case on
the basis of statutory interpretation, and thus to avoid the constitutional issues raised by
the jurisdiction conferring claim under § 1983.
"0 Florida E.C.R.R. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1195 (5th Cir. 1975); Leather's
Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800, 809-11 (2d Cir. 1971); Synthesis, supra note
15. See Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 714-15 (1973).
31 See text accompanying notes 49-61 infra.
32 See 13 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3567 (1975).
Fortune, supra note 15, at 8, notes that FELA cases and § 1983 give rise to the majority
of pendent party disputes.
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B. ResJudicata and the Need for a
Federal Forum
The consequence of denying pendent party jurisdiction is
that plaintiff's state claims must be raised in state court, leaving
the federal questions for determination in a separate federal
forum.3  This prospect of split litigation may influence the plain-
tiff to bring the entire matter into the state tribunal to avoid the
delay, expense, and possible contradictory holdings of the split
suit.34 Such an inhibiting effect on federal actions sacrifices the
authoritative adjudication of federal questions in federal court,
35
which is especially needed when the civil rights claim under sec-
tion 1983 charges unconstitutional action under the aegis of the
state36 and justifiable because the purpose of section 1983 was to
open the federal courts to those claims thought to be unrelieved
by some state courts. 7
33 In cases where the agent is adequately bonded against tort suits, the need to
reach his employer is diminished. A personal judgment against him in federal court will
facilitate recovery on the bond in state court. Otherwise, the municipal employer will
have to be sued in state court on the respondeat superior issue. See 3 K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 25.04 (1958).
34 Section 1983 is open to concurrent federal and state court jurisdiction. Long v.
District of Columbia, 469 F.2d 927, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
" [T]he state courts may actually be less qualified to render decisions based on
the United States Constitution. The concept of state sovereignty fosters a
parochial outlook on individual claims of constitutional dimension. State courts
will often be most interested in questions of state law and in adapting constitu-
tional principles to local conditions rather than in fleshing out rules of general
application. The fact that many state judges are elected officials bolsters this
localized concern. Moreover, the state courts have no obligation to consider the
extra-territorial impact of their decisions, and although the highest court of a
state may be well aware that its judgments are subject to review by the Su-
preme Court, it will feel little compulsion to accept the rules of decision laid
down by the courts of appeals or the precedents of the federal district courts
sitting in its state.
McCormack, supra note 17, at 263-64 (footnotes omitted). See AMERICAN LAW INSTI-
TUTE, THE DIVISION OFJURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 164-68 (1969).
36 Petitioner Aldinger likewise argued the awkwardness of having to bring part or
all of her action in the state court, "in the very same building in which the acts that
gave rise to the violation occurred, and ask one agency of Spokane County, the court,
to assess damages against both the County and the employee of another county agency."
Brief for Petitioner at 59, Aldinger v. Howard, 96 S. Ct. 2413 (1976).
37 Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Aldinger, is clearly correct in his assertion, 96
S. Ct. at 2427-30, that the 42d Congress intended to open the federal courts to redress
civil rights violations by the states because of the failure of some state courts to enforce
such protections effectively. The following passages from the 1871 debates are illustra-
tive:
The United States courts are further above mere local influence than the
county courts; their judges can act with more independence, cannot be put
under terror, as local judges can; their sympathies are not so clearly identified
with those of the vicinage; the jurors are taken from the State, and not the
1977]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 125:1357
The alternative of splitting the civil rights claim-a section
1983 action against the individual wrongdoer, and a state court
suit of vicarious or independent liability against the municipal
employer-is still possible after Aldinger. Yet splitting the federal
and state claims will preserve the underlying issue of liability for
infringement of constitutional rights for federal court only if the
state litigation does not preclude federal adjudication of the
same facts. If plaintiff loses the first action to reach judgment, he
will be barred from relitigating liability in the parallel suit.
3 8 If
the state litigation reaches judgment first,39 the rule that prior
state proceedings will not operate as resjudicata on a subsequent
section 1983 action if the constitutional issues were not heard in
state court, even if recognized, 40 will not avail a plaintiff whose
state claim was premised on vicarious liability and necessarily
neighborhood; they will be able to rise above prejudices or bad passions or
terror more easily.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 460 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Coburn). "[R]ecords of
the [state] tribunals are searched in vain for any evidence of effective redress ...
Hence this bill throws open the doors of the United States courts to those whose rights
under the Constitution are denied or impaired." Id. 374-76 (remarks of Rep. Lowe).
See, e.g., id. 321 (Rep. Stoughton); id. 333-34 (Rep. Hoar); id. 389 (Rep. Elliot); id. 394
(Rep. Rainey); id. 429 (Rep. Beatty); id. 345 (Sen. Sherman); id. 505 (Sen. Pratt); id 577
(Sen. Carpenter); id. 651 (Sen. Sumner); id. 653 (Sen. Osborn).
See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-42 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
180 (1961) ("It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation [§ 1983] was passed
was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion,
neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced ...."); Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879) (§ 1983 intended to enforce 14th Amendment
"against State action ... whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial"); P.
BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 922-23 (2d ed. 1973); Fortune, supra note 15, at 8.
The parochialism and prejudice of state courts of the 1870's may have abated, but
the issue remains vital as a result of the Court's singleminded focus on the congres-
sional intent in enacting § 1983. If the Court's approach requires indifference to the
apparent dissipation of the original reasons for the municipality exclusion, see note 92
infra and accompanying text, it would hardly be consistent for it to emphasize modern
policy factors diminishing the need for a federal forum to litigate civil rights claims.
" See Virginia Note, supra note 15, at 209-10 discussing the special problems faced
by § 1983 plaintiffs because of the "no mutuality" trend in the law of res judicata.
Petitioner Aldinger claimed resultant prejudice. Brief for Petitioner at 51 & n.15, Al-
dinger v. Howard, 96 S. Ct. 2413 (1976).
" Note the short statute of limitations on the action against the county in Aldinger.
WASH. REV. CODE § 36.45.010 (1974) (120 days). For discussion of the possible role of
federal court abstention in such a case, see McCormack, supra note 17, at 293.
4, See Newman v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 277 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
1004 (1975); Lombard v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 976 (1975); McCormack, supra note 17, at 250, 291. But see, e.g., Frazier v. East
Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 363 F.2d 861 (5th Cir. 1966) (prior state adjudication
is conclusive on all issues that might have been raised respecting plaintiff's claim of
wrongful dismissal of employment, even though constitutional issues were not raised
until later § 1983 suit at bar).
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litigated the constitutional violations of the municipal em-
ployee.41 Even if plaintiff wins his federal suit against the in-
dividual tortfeasor, the municipality may relitigate both its own
and the underlying liability of its servant, unless it actively par-
ticipated in the federal litigation against the individual defen-
dant.
4 2
Two points are illustrated by these possible applications of
res judicata to the split civil rights suit. First, although Aldinger
on its face does not deny a federal forum for the individual-
liability suit within the scope of section 1983, familiar and facially
neutral rules of preclusion may in effect deny the plaintiff a
federal forum for any matter litigated in state court and binding
on the federal action. Second, the principles of fairness and judi-
cial economy that underlie res judicata43 are similar to those
justifying pendent jurisdiction.44 The justifications for a single
adjudication are especially strong when the state claim is respon-
deat superior and the case to be proven corresponds closely to
the federal case of personal liability. 45 Relitigating the facts when
the claims are so similar would contravene the policy noted in
Monroe v. Pape,46 that "[t]he federal remedy [section 1983] is
supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be
first sought and refused before the federal one is invoked.
'47
C. The Analogy to Ancillary Jurisdiction
The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction allows parties to claims
lacking independent federal subject matter jurisdiction-such as
41 Independent suits litigating the same liability raise the possibility of inconsistent
adjudications and of mulcting the defendants for excess damages if plaintiff succeeds in
both federal and state court. See Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 612-13
(1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). The potential for inconsistent adjudications is especially
troublesome where the pendent claim under state law supplements and effectuates fed-
eral law. E.g., Sherrod v. Pink Hat Cafe, 250 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Miss. 1965) (state
assault claim pendent to § 1983 claim against same defendant). See text accompanying
notes 96-97 infra.
42 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 96, 99 (1942); W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw OF AGENCY § 95 (1964). In the most troubling cases, where plaintiff asserts alterna-
tive liability against the federal and state defendants, forcing him to split his action
opens the possibility that both defendants may successfully assert that the other party
was solely liable. The prospect of such inconsistent adjudication is noted in Fortune,
supra note 15, at 9. See text accompanying note 101 infra. See also 3A MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 18.07[1.-4], at 1952-53 (2d ed. 1948).
43 50 C.J.S.Judgments § 592 (1947 & Supp. 1976) (collecting authorities).
44 See text accompanying note 21 supra.
45 Kates & Kouba, Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act,
45 S. CAL. L. REV. 131, 163 (1972).
46 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See text accompanying note 10 supra.
47 365 U.S. at 183. Ironically, Monroe raised the problem by excluding local gov-
ernments from liability under § 1983.
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counterclaims 48 or third party claims49-to become part of a fed-
eral Suit.1  Ancillary power permits federal adjudication of
claims ordinarily confined to state courts, provided they arise
from the same transaction generating the federal claim.
Petitioner Aldinger relied on the similarity of joining parties
under pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, and suggested that the
novel strategy of joining pendent parties stretches the limits of
article III no more than does the well-recognized doctrine of
ancillary jurisdiction.
5 1
Ancillary jurisdiction, grounded in "fairness" to the par-
ties, 5 2 was historically distinguished from pendent jurisdiction,
which fostered judicial economy and convenience. 53 Gibbs' ad-
dition of "fairness" to the test for pendent jurisdiction pro-
vided a nexus between the two doctrines. 54 This change was a
consequence of Gibbs' redefinition of the scope of pendentjuris-
diction. Gibbs rejected the older view that pendent jurisdiction
was proper only where the state claim was inherent in the same
"cause of action" as the federal claim, 55 and held that pendent
jurisdiction could be asserted when plaintiff's claims arose "from
a common nucleus of operative fact. . . . such that he would
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceed-
ing."'56 This standard substantially follows the ancillary jurisdic-
tion "same transaction" test expounded in Moore v. New York
Cotton Exchange.57 In Moore, the Court declared that a federal
court had power to decide a compulsory counterclaim although
it lacked an independent jurisdictional base.
The Aldinger opinion minimizes the apparent congruity of
pendent party and ancillary jurisdiction by suggesting that
Moore, not Gibbs, was the "decisional bridge" between ancillary
and pendent jurisdiction. 58 Moore, however, spoke only to the
"
8
E.g., United Artists Corp. v. Masterpiece Prods., Inc., 221 F.2d 213 (2d Cir.
1955). See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
49
E.g., Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959). See FED. R. Civ. P. 14; Synthesis,
supra note 15, at 1282-84.
" For cases dealing with ancillary jurisdiction, see, e.g., Moore v. New York Cotton
Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 609-10 (1926); Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61 (1885).
51 Brief for Petitioner at 8-18, Aldinger v. Howard, 96 S. Ct. 2413 (1976). See
Astor-Honor Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627, 630 (2d Cir. 1971); Fortune,
supra note 15, at 13; Synthesis, supra note 15, at 1264-74. But see Virginia Note, supra
note 15, at 194 n.2, 212-13; Shakman, supra note 15.
5 See Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1955).
5 See Synthesis, supra note 15, at 1263-74.
54 Id. 1273-74.
15 Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
56 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
57 270 U.S. 593, 609-10 (1926).
58 96 S. Ct. at 2419. The matter is confounded somewhat by the fact that Moore was
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issue of ancillary jurisdiction over state claims against parties
already subject to federal claims. Although the case is considered
a seminal decision on ancillary jurisdiction, it did not involve a
third party action against an ancillary party, over whom no inde-
pendent federal jurisdiction would have existed, but rather dealt
with a state-law counterclaim between the parties already in fed-
eral court.59 By relying on Moore instead of on Gibbs and ancil-
lary jurisdiction cases reaching nonfederal parties, the Court
failed to consider fully the proposition that pendent and ancil-
lary jurisdiction are co-extensive.
60
II. THE COURT'S RELIANCE ON "IMPLICATIONS" FROM
THE SCOPE OF SECTION 1983
Aldinger rejected the foregoing arguments favoring pendent
party jurisdiction on the basis of a fundamentally different ap-
proach than Gibbs had taken. Instead of deciding whether the
state and federal claims arose from the same operative facts,
61
the Court was concerned solely with Congress' definition of the
scope of federal subject-matter jurisdiction as additionally de-
relied on by the Court in Hum, which also propounded the narrow "same cause of
action" test of pendent jurisdiction disapproved in Gibbs.
59 In Florida E.C.R.R. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1195 (5th Cir. 1975), sus-
taining pendent party jurisdiction of a claim against a non-federal party, the court was
persuaded in part by the fact that the new defendant was already impleaded under the
aegis of ancillary jurisdiction.
60 Other courts have nevertheless rejected the notion. In perhaps the closest cor-
respondence of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction, where plaintiff asserts pendent state
claims against an ancillary third party defendant, federal courts often refuse jurisdic-
tion. E.g., Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977) (analogizing Aldinger);
Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1972). See 3A MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 14.27[1], at 565-74 (2d ed. 1974). This is suggested in Virginia
Note, supra note 15, at 213. Moreover, "pendenting" parties presents a problem of
fairness absent in pendent claims against the federal defendant: the pendent party may
be subject to personal jurisdiction only because of nationwide service of process au-
thorized by the jurisdiction-conferring claim, or may be brought into an improper
venue. These caveats were expressed by Judge Friendly in Astor-Honor Inc. v. Grosset
& Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627, 629 n.2 (2d Cir. 1971). Compare Cooper v. North Jersey
Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 980-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (pendent claim allowed although
defendant made subject to personal jurisdiction by extraterritorial service) with Lasch v.
Antkies, 161 F. Supp. 851, 852 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (state claim may not be joined to federal
suit when personal jurisdiction of defendant effected by nationwide service). Neither
venue nor personal jurisdiction, it appears, would have presented a problem in Aldinger.
As to the general applicability of these objections, one might question whether they are
properly addressed to the discretion of the district court to deny pendent party jurisdic-
tion because of unfairness, or rather suggest constitutional barriers to the doctrine.
Aldinger does not reach these issues. The Court found "little profit in attempting to
decide, for example, whether there are any 'principled' differences between pendent
and ancillary jurisdiction, or, if there were, what effects Gibbs had on such differences."
96 S. Ct. at 2419.
61 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
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terminative of the pendent party question. Of primary concern
were prior judicial interpretations of the Civil Rights Act of
1871.62 In Monroe v. Pape,63 the Court considered the proposed
Sherman Amendment 4 to that Act which would have imposed
liability on a municipality for damage caused by private violence
within its borders and discerned a response to it "so antagonistic
that we cannot believe that the word 'person' was used in this
particular Act to include [municipalities]. ' 65 Monroe decided only
a section 1983 suit for damages against the city of Chicago, but
City of Kenosha v. Bruno6 extended municipal immunity to suits
in equity, and Moor v. County of Alameda67 held that the exemp-
tion would bar recovery against municipalities even when state
law waived municipal tort immunity.
68
Aldinger's reliance on congressional intent to immunize
municipalities, without accepting the dissent's challenge to ex-
plore the legislative history, is difficult to justify. Although legis-
lative histories may often yield too much or too little to be of
service in construing statutory law, 69 and, as Mr. Justice Rehn-
quist observed, the House speeches respecting the 1871 Civil
Rights Act are characterized by "diverse strains,'117  discerning
the original congressional intent is necessary to determining the
appropriate scope of the Aldinger rule. The congressional under-
62 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
63 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
64 Proposed, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (1871); adopted by Senate, id.
704-05; rejected by House, id. 725; conference committee report, id. 749; House rejects
revised Amendment, id. 800-01.
65 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961). Municipal immunity under § 1983 is
to be distinguished from the prevailing view that persons not otherwise immunized by
§ 1983 nevertheless will not be liable for the constitutional torts of their servants under
the doctrine of respondeat superior. Sebastian v. United States, 531 F.2d 900, 904 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 153 (1976); Milton v. Nelson, 527 F.2d 1158, 1159 (9th Cir.
1975); Jennings v. Davis, 476 F.2d 1271, 1274-75 (8th Cir. 1973). Contra, Croy v. Skin-
ner, 410 F. Supp. 117, 123-24 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Hill v. Toll, 320 F. Supp. 185, 188-89
(E.D. Pa. 1970); C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACT: CIVIL PRACTICE § 90 at 117
(1971). Of course, Aldinger might have argued alternatively that this rule should not
apply, or, even if it did as a matter of federal law, it did not confine the scope of
vicarious liability under state law. Finally, this rule does not preclude claims of inde-
pendent personal liability, although the combined effect of Monroe's municipal immu-
nity and Aldinger is to preclude federal suits against municipalities whether the theory
of recovery is personal or vicarious liability.
66 412 U.S. 507 (1973). See Kates & Kouba, supra note 46, at 147-52.
67 411 U.S. 693 (1973). See note 81 infra.
68 See note 81 infra & text accompanying notes 91-94 infra.
69 See, e.g., Bishin, The Law Finders, An Essay in Statutory Interpretation, 38 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1, 3 (1965). See generally Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 540-44 (1947).
7" 96 S. Ct. at 2421-22 n.12.
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standing in 1871 of the Sherman Amendment proposal must be
examined in addition to Monroe in order to determine what was
the intended scope of the municipality exemption. Because
Aldinger's inference of congressional intent to bar local govern-
ments as pendent parties to section 1983 actions depends solely
on the holding in Monroe and its progeny that local governments
are immune from federal liability under section 1983-a holding
that in turn depended solely on the legislative history of the
provision-the legislative history itself must be evaluated to un-
derstand the limits of the exemption perceived by Monroe. This
understanding is relevant to the assumption" underlying Al-
dinger's circumvention rationale-that the intent to exclude mu-
nicipalities from federal liability disfavors pendent party juris-
diction over municipalities altogether.'
Although the congressional debates on the Sherman Amend-
ment confirm the observation in Monroe, followed in Aldinger,
that the House of Representatives overwhelmingly rejected the
imposition of federal liability on municipalities, 72 they also reveal
the accuracy of two points made by Mr. Justice Brennan, dissent-
ing in Aldinger: first, that the House responsible for rejecting the
Sherman Amendment was aware of several state laws waiving
vicarious municipal immunity in tort for damage incurred from
riots within the municipality; second, that the debates evidence
hostility only to imposing liability under federal law, not to con-
ferring federal jurisdiction over state-created claims against cities
and counties.73
Because the House was aware that, at least in four states, the
local government was already vicariously liable under state law
for the same acts that would have been actionable under the
Sherman Amendment,7 4 it might have felt unjustified in impos-
ing additional federal liability. In rejecting the Sherman
Amendment, the Congress explicitly recognized that the very
liability they refused to impose on the federal level did in fact
exist on the state level.
71 Mr. Justice Brennan, in dissent, challenged the majority to explore the legislative
history of § 1983. He concluded that the intent of the 42d Congress was to avoid
imposing federal liability for civil rights incursions on local governments, not to bar
their presence in federal court altogether. Id. at 2424-30. The Court responded that the
debates cited indicate, if anything, only that the enactment of the 1871 Act was not
meant to alter federal diversity jurisdiction of municipal corporations. Id.
72 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 804 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Poland).
71 96 S. Ct. at 2425 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74 The Sherman Amendment was very similar to, and probably modelled on, some
of these state provisions. Compare CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 663 (Sherman
Amendment) with id. 792 (Massachusetts law).
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An examination of the legislative history of section 1983,
even acknowledging the opposition to imposing federal liability
on local governments, nonetheless recognizes that such liability
could rightfully exist under state law. Although section 1983
does not reach municipalities whose immunity is waived by state
law,' 5 such a waiver may impose vicarious liability on the munic-
ipality as a matter of state law, consistent with the congressional
intent in enacting section 1983. This is precisely what Aldinger
attempted: to recover from the county's agent under federal law
and from the county under state law of respondeat superior and
waiver of municipal tort immunity.76
Justice Brennan's second point is that the legislative history
bespeaks no hostility to litigating state claims against local gov-
ernments where authorized by an independent state grant of
subject matter jurisdiction. 77 In its blanket holding that section
1983 will not support a pendent party action, Aldinger focused
exclusively on the scope of the federal claim and its exemption
of municipalities, ignoring the relationship of the proposed pen-
dent claim. This approach is not warranted by the legislative
history. Even if joinder of a state claim of respondeat superior
contingent on the underlying section 1983 liability and on nothing
more is an impermissible "circumvention" of the local govern-
ment exemption under section 1983, the legislative history does
not warrant denying pendent party jurisdiction against the city
or county where the state claim arises independently under state
law within the same operative facts. Easily imaginable cases,
'7 8
such as a state claim for breach of a municipal employment
contract pendent to a section 1983 claim for unconstitutional
dismissal, would meet Mr. Justice Brennan's observation that
75 Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 698-710 (1973). The contrary view
had been espoused in Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. District of Columbia v. Carter, 407 U.S. 418 (1973). Other circuits, by
contrast, reached the same result later approved by the Court in Moor. E.g., Ries v.
Lynskey, 452 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1971); Brown v. Town of Caliente, 392 F.2d 546 (9th
Cir. 1968). Cf. Greenway v. Thompson, 368 F. Supp. 387 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (city may not
be pendent party defendant to § 1983 action when state has not waived municipal
immunity for torts of government employees).
"6 See note 5 supra.
"E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 794 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Poland).
18 Such cases have already arisen. E.g., Stamm v. Trigg, 368 F. Supp. 83 (N.D.
Ohio 1973) (claim of negligence against prison doctors pendent to § 1983 claim against
prison authorities); Anthony v. Cleveland, 355 F. Supp. 789, 793 (D. Hawaii 1973)
(breach of contract pendent to § 1983 claim against state university). Stamm retained
jurisdiction; Anthony, following the Ninth Circuit rule, dismissed the pendent claim. See
note 21 supra.
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Congress did not wish to disturb independent jurisdiction of
state law claims against cities.79
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF
MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
In addition to resting on questionable historical assump-
tions, the Court's concern about "circumvention" of the local
government exemption under section 1983 fails to consider re-
lated provisions8s that may authorize a similar result, such as
federal question jurisdiction.
A claim not made in Aldinger arises when civil rights plain-
tiffs rely on general federal question jurisdiction,8s alleging the
requisite amount in controversy and seeking relief directly under
the appropriate constitutional guarantee8 2 instead of under sec-
tion 1983 and the civil rights jurisdictional grant.8 3
79 As federal question jurisdiction was not enacted until 1875, Congress only in-
tended that diversity suits against municipalities, premised on state law, not be dis-
turbed.
80 One such related provision is 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970), stating that where federal
laws "are not adapted to the object [of protecting the civil rights of all persons in the
United States], or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies
...," state laws, "not inconsistent with the Constitutional and laws of the United States,"
may be used as a supplement to remedy the deficiency. This wording is susceptible to
ambiguous application in the Aldinger context. On the one hand, the provision's concern
about suitable remedies might suggest the use of state liability where necessary to make
§ 1983 "fully effective." On the other hand, the desire for consistency appears to fore-
close § 1988 liability because the importation of state waiver of municipal immunity
might be viewed as contrary to the congressional intent to exclude government entities
from liability under § 1983. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), explor-
ing the limits of § 1988 in relation to section 1983, chose the latter interpretation. Id. at
698-710. In Moor, the Court upheld the dismissal of a § 1988 action against a munici-
pality on the grounds that such a suit would thwart Congress' intent in § 1983.
Yet Moor does not govern the outcome in Aldinger. A commentator recently sug-
gested that Moor's holding "rests not upon an extension of Monroe's rule that section
1983 does not reach municipalities, but upon the 'limited function of § 1988 in the
scheme of federal civil rights legislation.'" Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipalities
for Constitutional Violations, 89 HARV. L. REV. 922, 941 (1976) (quoting 411 U.S. at 700
n.10). Moor was concerned that § 1988 not be seen as authorizing the "wholesale impor-
tation into federal law of state causes of action." 411 U.S. at 703-04. Aldinger's suit, by
contrast, involved no such danger. She did not seek an extension of federal liability but
only the opportunity to litigate a state claim in federal court. Moor's holding does little,
therefore, to support Aldinger's circumvention rationale. Mr. Justice Brennan concurred
in Moor's finding that § 1988 could not be used to supply a right against municipalities
as a matter of federal law, but dissented from Aldinger's finding that raising the state
claim in federal court impermissibly circumvents the limitations on § 1983.
"1 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
82 E.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (fourth
amendment).
83 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).
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Whether federal question suits may be maintained against
parties immune from liability under section 1983 is unclear. The
curious result of permitting such actions would be to hold
municipalities answerable for incursions on constitutional rights
only when the court valued such rights above the jurisdictional
minimum so as to qualify for federal question jurisdiction. That
courts have taken divergent attitudes in valuating the amount in
controversy in cases premised solely on the abridgment of such
intangibles as constitutional rights indicates the uncertainties of
this approach. 84 Nevertheless, articulate justifications for such
results have been made,85 and federal question suits premised
directly on the Constitution have attained results even beyond
the reach of a parallel section 1983 action.
86
84 Compare Grant v. Hogan, 505 F.2d 1220, 1225 (3d Cir. 1974) (amount in con-
troversy must be met to sustain § 1331 jurisdiction in civil rights suit) with Rowland v.
Tarr, 378 F. Supp. 766, 770 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (court will accept plaintiff's representation
that two years in military is worth over S10,000 to him).
8- Examination of the legislative histories of §§ 1983 and 1331 suggests that the
bar against suing a municipality under § 1983 should not be read into § 1331.
The legislative history of § 1983 reviewed by the Court in Monroe shows that
the absence of a required amount in controversy was one of the concerns
voiced by the Act's opponents.... When the predecessor of § 1331 was passed
four years later, however, it included the requirement of a stated amount in
controversy. The passage of § 1331 was also motivated by very different con-
siderations than those to which § 1983 was a response. § 1983 was an effort by
the Congress to provide a forumn and a remedy for those whose rights were
being violated but who could get no relief in the courts or agencies of their
states .... Amendments were offered extending liability specifically to include
cities and counties, but many members of Congress were unwilling to extend
liabilities to municipalities, 'the mere instrumentality for the administration of
state law.' . . . As finally passed, the act provided redress only against the
persons who were depriving others of their rights. The Act of March 3, 1875,
the predecessor of § 1331, on the other hand, was the culmination of efforts
dating back to the first Congress to give general federal question jurisdiction to
the federal judiciary. See Chadbourn & Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal
Questions, 90 U.Pa.L. Rev. 639, 639-645 (1942). This revolutionary step in
strengthening the federal government against the states was made with no sub-
stantive debate . . . . The record is silent as to whether Congress meant to
make municipalities liable for the acts of their agents which violate federal law.
While it may be argued that Congress assumed that suits in federal court
against municipalities would be unconstitutional, as had recently been vigor-
ously argued in the debates over the passage of § 1983 .... it is not the role of
the Court to read in such a limitation in the absence of any legislative history.
Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 312 F. Supp. 647, 650-51 (N.D. Cal. 1974), quoted with ap-
proval in Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709, 716-17 (D.N.
J. 1976). For a detailed analysis reaching the same conclusion, see Note, supra note 81,
at 939-51.
86 City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 516 (1973) (Brennan, J., concurring);
District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1973) (federal question jurisdic-
tion supports civil rights suit against District police immune under § 1983 because Dis-
trict law is not "state" law within meaning of § 1983) (dictum); Hampton v. Holmesburg
Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir.
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Aldinger's effect on this trend is significant. Two recent dis-
trict court opinions cited it for the proposition that municipal-
ities may not be sued under the fourteenth amendment because
of the analogous section 1983 exemption and the circumven-
tion rationale.8 7 This incipient reading of Aldinger would inad-
vertently render the Court's guarded holding a fundamental
revision or the meaning of federal question jurisdiction-a
change so important the Supreme Court declined to decide it
in both City of Kenosha v. Bruno88 and Aldinger.89 The influence
of Aldinger on constitutional federal question claims against
municipalities awaits clarification by the Court, but the potency
of the circumvention rationale is increasingly obvious.
The Court's single-minded focus on the scope of section
1983 to determine the limits of pendent party jurisdiction is
difficult to harmonize with the possibility of imposing liability on
municipalities directly under the federal constitution. By adopt-
ing the Gibbs focus on the character of the pendent claim, the
Court might have weighed the cautionary value of Congress'
municipality exemption under section 1983 against countervail-
ing factors and plausible expressions of congressional intent in
favor of municipality liability. Even if the federal question juris-
dictional grant does not specifically refer to municipalities, other
enactments imposing federal liability on municipalities for four-
teenth amendment violations suggest that there is no modern
congressional policy absolutely exempting municipalities from
such responsibility. 9" Additionally, the Forty-Second Congress
1975); Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 501 F.2d 31, 44 (3d
Cir. 1974), vacated & remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 983 (1975); Hartigh v. Latin,
485 F.2d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 948 (1974); Gomez v. Wilson, 477
F.2d 411, 419-21 & n.56 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See Patterson v. Ramsey, 413 F. Supp. 523,
528 (D. Md. 1976) (collecting district court cases). But see Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger,
528 F.2d 1194, 1200-01 & n.10 (9th Cir. 1975) (withholding judgment on federal ques-
tion claims against parties immune under § 1983); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 95-96
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (same). In Brault v. Town of Milton, 527 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1975), a
panel of the Court of Appeals, in deciding to grant appellee's application for a rehear-
ing of an appeal en banc, ruled that § 1331 would support a suit against parties not
reachable under § 1983. The Second Circuit upon rehearing en banc declined to decide
the 14th amendment question and the other issues raised by the parties, including the
§ 1331 question. Id. at 736.
87 Dawes v. Philadelphia Gas Comm'n, 421 F. Supp. 806, 821 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Pit-
rone v. Mercadante, 420 F. Supp. 1384, 1390-91 (E.D. Pa. 1976). But see Hupart v.
Board of Higher Educ., 420 F. Supp. 1087, 1103-04 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (§ 1331 supports
claim against defendant not joinable as pendent party on authority of Aldinger).
88 412 U.S. 507, 514 (1973) (refusing to decide issue without adequate briefing).
89 96 S. Ct. at 2415-16 n.3.
'"E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), (b), & (h) (Supp. IV 1974) (employment discrimina-
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remitted municipalities from liability for reasons that have
largely dissipated in the intervening years. 91
Aldinger inferred the exemption on the basis of the rejection
of the Sherman Amendment-a provision imposing a much
harsher result than most applications of respondeat superior by
way of pendent party jurisdiction. 92 Finally, to permit pendent
party or federal question actions against municipalities would
counter the criticism that the municipality exemption defeats the
broadly remedial purposes of section 1983 by frequently pre-
cluding suits against a financially responsible defendant,93 with-
out altering the scope of section 1983 to achieve this goal.
IV. PROBLEMS WITH THE CIRCUMVENTION RATIONALE
The issue in Aldinger was not whether the county defendant
must answer for plaintiff's alleged injury but rather whether it
91 This argument is made in McCormack, supra note 17, at 28-30; Note, supra note
81, at 947 & n.133. The reasons for Congress' conclusion that it lacked constitutional
power to impose liabilities were never clearly articulated by the 42d Congress. Possible
grounds are the 10th amendment, see CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 788 (1871)
(remarks of Rep. Kerr), the 1 1th amendment, and the absence of a "state action" re-
quirement, see id. 772 (remarks of Sen. Thurman). The accuracy of Congress' own view
of its power in this respect is doubted by Justice Douglas, dissenting in City of Kenosha
v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 520 (1973), and somewhat more reservedly by the Court in
Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 709 (1973). The 11th amendment does not
bar suits against municipalities, e.g., Markham v. City of Newport News, 292 F.2d 711,
716-18 (4th Cir. 1961); see Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98-101 (1972); the
absence of a state action requirement in the Sherman Amendment would be irrelevant
to attempts to join a municipality as a pendent party defendant to a claim of uncon-
stitutional action by its agent. See note 93 infra.
A more pragmatic reason for the exemption was the fear of draining local
treasuries to compensate individuals for the depredations of the Ku Klux Klan. CONG.
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 763-64 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Casserly). The widespread
waiver of governmental immunity by the states themselves for the torts of their em-
ployees, and the proposed liability for private action in the Sherman Amendment, see
note 93 infra, suggest a lesser concern for local treasuries. See Kates & Kouba, supra
note 46, at 136-37; McCormack, supra note 17, at 28-30.
92 The Sherman Amendment, supra note 62, was harsh but aimed only at a particu-
lar evil. It would have required the political subdivision to relieve the effects of riot
within its borders at suit of the damaged individual even where the municipality had
neither the duty nor the means of keeping peace nor awareness or control of the pri-
vate wrongdoer. The drastic nature of this strict liability met strong opposition. E.g.,
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 762 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Stevenson); id. 776-77
(Sen. Freilinghausen); id. 787-88 (Rep. Kerr); id. 763-64 (Sen. Casserly). As one student
commentator has observed, "[T]he evil against which the Sherman Amendment was
directed and the liability which it proposed bear little resemblance to those associated
with a [federal question damage suit premised on the Fourteenth Amendment] against
municipalities .... " Note, supra note 81, at 948. The same might be said of Aldinger's
respondeat superior claim against the pendent county defendant.
93 See Kates & Kouba, supra note 46, at 136-37 (citing authorities); McCormack,
supra note 17, at 28-30.
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need do so in federal or state court. The Court's circumvention
rationale is persuasive only where the state claim is so similar to
the federal claim that the defendant would unjustly be subjected
to a judgment under state law while the parallel federal law
would absolve him in the same suit. The rationale has consider-
ably less force where the pendent claim arises from the same
facts but on a different legal theory than the federal claim. 94 But
under Aldinger a state claim arising from the same operative facts
as a federal claim but reaching additional parties, thereby im-
plicating federal policy and presenting a propitious case for the
exercise of pendent jurisdiction under Gibbs, is likely to be dis-
missed because it appears to extend federal liability, and not just
federal jurisdiction, to parties "excluded" by Congress. The plain-
tiff is thus in a double bind: to avoid Aldinger, he must demon-
strate that his pendent party claim is sufficiently independent
from the federal one so that the exemption of the pendent de-
fendant from federal liability does not imply a congressional
intent to shield that party from state-created liability in federal
court.95 But requiring the claims to be sufficiently independent
undermines the very argument in Gibbs96 favoring pendent party
jurisdiction: where the pendent claim clearly implicates federal
policy, or where the facts to be proven on both claims are essen-
tially similar, then discretion to hear the state claim is properly
exercised.
Aldinger's approach in contexts besides section 1983 will
produce illogical results, as one example outside the civil rights
area indicates. In Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Craton ,
a labor union sued an employer and insurance company for a
94 See text accompanying note 79 supra.
95 A case in which the state claim adds vicarious liability to an underlying federal
liability, and the only additional facts to be proven concern the agency relationship of
the state and federal defendant, presents a more workable opportunity for joinder than
does a case in which an independent state theory of liability requires proof of many
additional facts. See Kates & Kouba, supra note 46, at 166-67. Aldinger, however, coun-
sels that the former case more likely represents a "circumvention" of limits on federal
liability, requiring dismissal of the pendent party claim.
96 "There may . . . be situations in which the state claim is so closely tied to ques-
tions of federal policy that the argument for exercise of pendent jurisdiction is particu-
larly strong." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966). In Gibbs, the
pendent state contract claim was answered on the theory that the federal labor statutes
(which gave rise to the jurisdiction-conferring federal questions in the case) had pre-
empted the field. The Court said, "In the present case . . . the allowable scope of the
state claim implicates the federal doctrine of pre-emption; while this interrelationship
does not create statutory federal question jurisdiction . . . . its existence is relevant to
the exercise of discretion." Id. (citations omitted). See generally Kates & Kouba, supra
note 46, at 167.
97 405 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1968).
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declaration of rights accruing to the union members under a
health insurance plan contracted between the two defendants
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement between the plain-
tiff union and defendant employer. Section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act 98 conferred subject matter jurisdic-
tion over the action between the parties to the collective bargain-
ing agreement. The Fifth Circuit held that, even if a suit against
the defendant insurance company was not within the jurisdic-
tional ambit of section 301, the district court properly heard the
contract claim under the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction:
"[T]he fact that the claims under the insurance contract and the
collective bargaining agreement originated in a 'common nucleus
of operative fact' gave the district court pendent jurisdiction over
Connecticut General irrespective of the dimensions of § 301."99
The court acknowledged several considerations favoring
pendent jurisdiction: the plaintiff would otherwise have had to
split alternative claims, creating the possibility of inconsistent
results;"' although the contract claim arose under state law, it
implicated federal labor policy; and, as the court observed, the
procedural posture of the case counseled against discretionary
dismissal of the pendent claim.""1 A mechanical application of
Aldinger, however, would probably require dismissal, in that the
court allowed joinder of the federal and pendent claims without
referring to "the dimensions of § 301"-a provision that would
not reach the defendant.
The circumvention rationale presents a second difficulty.
Aldinger should be limited to instances where the exemption is
from substantive liability rather than from the failure to meet a
jurisdictional prerequisite. In the latter situation, Gibbs would
warrant the joining of claims out of fairness to the plaintiff. Mr.
Justice Rehnquist attempted to distinguish Gibbs on the ground
that Aldinger, unlike Gibbs, was complicated by the presence of a
congressional grant of jurisdiction narrowing the bounds of the
federal action."" Because of this exclusion of municipalities
from substantive federal liability, he inferred that section
1343(3)103 of title 28, which grants civil rights jurisdiction over
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
405 F.2d at 48 (emphasis supplied).
"" The union alleged that either the insurance company was not fulfilling the con-
tract or that the employer had failed to abide by the collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 43.
I " Id. at 48.
1,,2 96 S. Ct. at 2420-21.
,03 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).
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"any civil action authorized by law," could not confer jurisdiction
in a federal civil rights suit over a pendent municipality defen-
dant.'1 4 By collapsing questions of jurisdiction and substantive
liability, the Court does not acknowledge that its circumvention
rationale should apply only when the challenged pendent party
is exempt from liability under substantive federal law, and not
when the exemption is purely jurisdictional, as when the pen-
dent party fails the rule of complete diversity or is defendant to
a federal claim below the jurisdictional minimum.1'" 5 As Mr.
Justice Brennan observed:
At one level of analysis, this test is of course meaning-
less, being capable of application to all cases, because all
instances of asserted pendent party jurisdiction will by
definition involve a party as to whom Congress has im-
pliedly "addressed itself" by not expressly conferring
subject-matter jurisdiction on the federal courts. 
1
1
6
The distinction between a claim that fails to meet federal
jurisdictional prerequisites, and a claim that fails because the de-
fendant is immune under substantive federal law is illustrated by
Almenares v. Wyman.'" The Second Circuit approved pendent
party jurisdiction of a class action litigating aspects of the federal
AFDC statute'18 although the class failed to satisfy the amount in
controversy prerequisite to federal question jurisdiction. As in
Aldinger, the jurisdictional anchor was a section 1983 claim
against different defendants than those in the class action. A
literal application of Aldinger forecloses pendent party jurisdic-
tion in section 1983 suits generally. Yet in Almenares, the scope of
section 1983 is patently irrelevant to the court's power to hear
the class action, which arises on a legal theory independent of
section 1983 and fails to trigger federal jurisdiction not because
the defendants are immune under section 1983 but because the
amount in controversy is wanting. Aldinger would automatically
require dismissal of the pendent party claim because jurisdiction
rested on section 1983. Yet the advantages of construing federal
welfare law in federal court, and thus incidentally avoiding the
constitutional questions broached by the underlying civil rights
claim,1 9 are undeniable.
,,14 96 S. Ct. at 2421.
1"" See cases cited in note 23 supra.
96 S. Ct. at 2424 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
"' 53 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 944 (1972).
1,, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1970).
1,,9 See text accompanying note 30 supra.
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V. CONCLUSION
Aldinger demonstrates that the path to a comprehensive law
of pendent party jurisdiction is unfinished. As the Court limited
its holding to a per se ban on the joining of nonfederal parties
only to section 1983 actions,""a cases arising under other grants
of federal jurisdiction presumably will continue to be decided
under the Gibbs rule.II To these cases, Aldinger only admonishes
that limitations inhering in the jurisdiction-conferring statute
may imply a congressional intent to so shape the contours of the
pendent action.
The problems inherent in Aldinger argue especially strongly
against extending its line of analysis. The circumvention
rationale has little meaning where the pendent claim joined to a
section 1983 action is in no sense contingent on a finding of
federal liability." 2 The Aldinger approach has no application to
situations in which the pendent party defendant can only dem-
onstrate that the claim against him is not cognizable under fed-
eral subject matter jurisdiction.
13
Aldinger's rigidity and potential broadness are difficult to
justify logically, and may lead to disallowance of pendent actions
that should be heard in federal court." 4 Section 1983 litigants
will now face substantial strategic problems.1 5 They must either
bring a federal court action against the employee and a state
court action of respondeat superior, with attendant res judicata
problems, or argue the entire cause in state court. If Aldinger is
applied in other contexts, it may lead to similar problems.
110 The Court eschewed an "all-encompassing jurisdictional rule," 96 S. Ct. at 2419,
and noted, "We decide here only the issue of so-called 'pendent party' jurisdiction with
respect to a claim brought under § 1343(3) and § 1983. Other statutory grants [of
jurisdiction] and other alignments of parties and claims might call for a different re-
sult." Id. at 2422.
1" 'See text accompanying note 21 supra.
112 Text accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
113 Mr. Justice Brennan called such an application "meaningless." Text accompany-
ing note 107 supra. See Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977) (on author-
ity of Aldinger, dismissing claim asserted by plaintiff against third party defendant in
diversity suit, where plaintiff and third party were not diverse).
114 Text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
"'Aldinger has been held to require dismissal of pendent party claims even where a
suit is not brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Tomkins v.
Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976); Gates v. Brockway Gas
Co., 79 CCH Lab. Cas. 11,780 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 1976). But see Bowen v. Evanuk,
423 F. Supp. 1341 (D.R.I. 1976) (Aldinger held not controlling pendent party claim in
diversity suit).
